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Centralized bargaining, multi-tasking and work incentives

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dc.creator Lindbeck, Assar
dc.creator Snower, Dennis J.
dc.date 1996
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:56:13Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:56:13Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/961
dc.identifier ppn:230970095
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/961
dc.description The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking - for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms’ profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how centralized bargaining inhibits firms from using wages to induce workers to learn how to use their experience from one set of tasks to enhance their performance at other tasks. In this way, the paper helps explain the increasing resistance to centralized bargaining in various advanced market economies.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Inst. for Internat. Economic Studies Stockholm
dc.relation Seminar paper / Institute for International Economic Studies 620
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject centralized wage bargaining
dc.subject restructuring
dc.subject technological change
dc.subject information flows
dc.subject employment
dc.subject wage formation
dc.subject unemployment
dc.subject organization of firms
dc.title Centralized bargaining, multi-tasking and work incentives
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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