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A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

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dc.creator Sotomayor Marilda
dc.date 2002
dc.date.accessioned 2013-05-30T10:47:23Z
dc.date.available 2013-05-30T10:47:23Z
dc.date.issued 2013-05-30
dc.identifier http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402002000300006
dc.identifier http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=openurl&genre=article&issn=00347140&date=2002&volume=56&issue=3&spage=497
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/123456789/4192
dc.description This paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation.
dc.publisher Fundação Getúlio Vargas
dc.source Revista Brasileira de Economia
dc.subject auction mechanism
dc.subject competitive equilibrium
dc.subject demand set
dc.title A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand


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