Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices

dc.creator	Richardson, Scott
dc.creator	Tuna, A. Irem
dc.creator	Wysocki, Peter D.
dc.date	2003-05-23T19:36:44Z
dc.date	2003-05-23T19:36:44Z
dc.date	2003-05-23T19:36:44Z
dc.date.accessioned	2013-06-04T16:19:00Z
dc.date.available	2013-06-04T16:19:00Z
dc.date.issued	2013-06-05
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3515
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721
dc.description	This paper explores whether firms that share common directors also pursue similar corporate policies. Using a sample of 885 U.S. firms with common directors, we find that director fixed effects strongly explain variation in firms' governance, financial, disclosure, and strategic policy choices. Moreover, the director fixed effects provide incremental explanatory power over traditional economic determinants of firms' policies. consistent with our hypotheses, the director effects are less pronounced in large firms, in firms with more outside board members, and for directors with numerous outside board appointments. Our evidence is more consistent with directors and firms "matching" their policy preferences rather than directors "imposing" their policy preferences on firms
dc.format	266604 bytes
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	en_US
dc.relation	MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4307-03
dc.subject	Board of Directors
dc.subject	Corporate Governance
dc.subject	Corporate Policies
dc.subject	Disclosure
dc.title	Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices
dc.type	Working Paper

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