| dc.creator |
Muslu, Volkan |
|
| dc.date |
2004-02-06T19:31:36Z |
|
| dc.date |
2004-02-06T19:31:36Z |
|
| dc.date |
2004-02-06T19:31:36Z |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-09T02:33:59Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-09T02:33:59Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-09 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4045 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721 |
|
| dc.description |
Using a broad sample of the largest European companies, I examine whether the two governance mechanisms, namely (i) independent monitoring by a board of directors and (ii) grants and disclosures of incentive-based executive pay, are substitutes for one another. I find that companies with proportionately more executives on their boards of directors grant greater incentive-based pay to their executives, and improve the transparency of their pay disclosure. The findings are consistent with the efficient contracting argument, which predicts that greater incentive-based pay and pay disclosure transparency mitigate agency problems generated by boards dependent upon management |
|
| dc.format |
282406 bytes |
|
| dc.format |
application/pdf |
|
| dc.language |
en_US |
|
| dc.relation |
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4432-03 |
|
| dc.subject |
Board Independence |
|
| dc.subject |
Compensation Structures |
|
| dc.subject |
Pay Disclosure |
|
| dc.subject |
International Corporate Governance |
|
| dc.title |
Board Independence, Executive Pay Structures, and Pay Disclosure: Evidence from Europe |
|
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
|