| dc.creator |
Xue, Yanfeng |
|
| dc.date |
2004-02-13T19:27:21Z |
|
| dc.date |
2004-02-13T19:27:21Z |
|
| dc.date |
2004-02-13T19:27:21Z |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-09T02:33:59Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-09T02:33:59Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-09 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4049 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721 |
|
| dc.description |
Firms obtain new technology either through internal R&D or through acquisitions. These two approaches are usually labeled as "make" and "buy" strategies. In this paper, I examine the relation between a firm's choice of "make" or "buy" and the performance measures used in the firm's CEO compensation contract. I focus on the two major differences between "make" and "buy" strategies: the risk levels and accounting treatments. I then examine the differential implications of accounting-based and stock-based performance measures on managers' incentive in choosing between the two strategies. Using data from US high tech industries, I find that, firms relying on "buy" approach to obtain technology tend to depend more on the accounting-based performance measures, while those firms who innovate through R&D activities skew toward stock-based pay especially stock options |
|
| dc.format |
194036 bytes |
|
| dc.format |
application/pdf |
|
| dc.language |
en_US |
|
| dc.relation |
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4436-03 |
|
| dc.subject |
R&D |
|
| dc.subject |
Acquisition |
|
| dc.subject |
Compensation |
|
| dc.subject |
Technology |
|
| dc.title |
Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation |
|
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
|