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Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry

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dc.creator Schmalensee, Richard
dc.date 2004-12-10T19:13:09Z
dc.date 2004-12-10T19:13:09Z
dc.date 2004-12-10T19:13:09Z
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-09T02:39:45Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-09T02:39:45Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-09
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7384
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721
dc.description US antitrust policy takes as its objective consumer welfare, not total economic welfare. With that objective, Joe Bain's definition of entry barriers is more useful than George Stigler's or definitions based on economic welfare. It follows that economies of scale that involve sunk costs may create antitrust barriers to entry. A simple model shows that sunk costs without scale economies may discourage entry without creating an antitrust entry barrier.
dc.format 194768 bytes
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language en_US
dc.relation MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4457-04
dc.subject antitrust
dc.subject U.S. antitrust policy
dc.subject entry barriers
dc.title Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry
dc.type Working Paper


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